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Abstract
In a context of laissez-faire, the propositions established in this paper shed light on the
evolution of the problem of greenhouse gas (GHG) accumulation in the atmosphere for each
type of strategic behaviour resulting from countries’ interconnection on global markets. In a
framework of strong economic interdependencies, they show the potential consequences of
the free trade arrangements on the environment and question the idea that free trade
liberalisation should necessarily lead to an increase in countries’ welfare. This paper provides
an exhaustive typology of countries’ strategic behaviours and a strong static comparative
analysis with regard to the exogenous parameters of the model. Whereas some assumptions
tend to be less relevant from an environmental point of view; others very relevant have not yet
been considered in the literature. Using lattice theoretic notions, this paper generalizes the
existing results of the literature and determines new equilibria not yet exploited. It thus
extends the current framework of the traditional public economic theory dealing with public
goods.
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1. Introduction
The distinctive characteristics of the problem of climate change turn it into a big challenge.
First of all, the environment – or the atmosphere, is a global public good that countries are
free to provide or to enjoy. It means that there is not a unique well identified and settled agent
responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; emissions are rather the indirect
consequence of the performance of a large group of economies. Secondly, States are
sovereign and no supranational authority exists to implement a globally optimal
environmental policy: each country has thus to decide voluntarily to reduce its GHG
emissions given a strong incentive to free ride. Finally, even if countries agree on the
existence of the problem and its urgency, national emissions are a strategic variable since they
are linked to national economic activities, and thus to economic growth and development.
Our paper relies on the literature studying international cooperation on climate change and
using non cooperative game theory. With regard to this literature, the efforts have been
essentially concentrated on the question of countries’ cooperation, rarely questioning the
nature of the interactions between countries (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993). Nonetheless this
question is fundamental because it determines the eventual consequences of the unilateral
implementation of environmental policies.1 In this literature, the almost universal argument
put forward has been that if a country or a group of countries undertakes to reduce its
emissions, the outsiders will have a positive incentive to increase their own emissions,
partially or totally cancelling the initial effort undertaken (Barrett, 1994, Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1993, Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006). In this case, strategies are supposed to
be substitutable. Nonetheless, a more recent literature in trade theory tends to show that
reinforcement effects exist between countries’ strategies, i.e. that the latter could be
complementary as well. This phenomenon would be linked to trade liberalization and
countries’ increasing inter-connexion on global markets, i.e. that trade liberalization has
fundamentally modified countries’ interactions over emission levels (Copeland and Taylor,
2005).2
In this paper we stay at a prior step reconsidering the substrate of a potential international
agreement; i.e. reconsidering the nature of the interactions between countries. In this respect,
there are two alternatives: countries’ strategies are either substitutable or complementary. 3,4
The propositions are established from the game in emissions, known in the literature as “the
global emission game”.5 It depicts a framework of strong interactions between countries,
where payoffs vary according to countries’ own strategy and the strategy adopted by the
others. In a purely non cooperative setting, each country determines its individual strategy
maximizing its own payoff given the strategy adopted by the others.

1

See Hoel (1991) analysing the consequences of one country reducing its emissions unilaterally when other
countries’ policy is dictated by their self-interest and Barrett (2003) developing a theory that explains both the
successes and the failures of treaties dealing with environmental problems such as climate change, acid rains,
depletion of the ozone layer, and so on.
2
The paper defends the idea that the traditional arguments supporting the nature of the interactions between
countries are incomplete or only valid in a closed economy setting.
3
The first alternative (the most frequent in the literature) is generally justified by the existence of carbon leakage
exacerbating the free-riding phenomenon. The second can be justified through international spillovers
(technological, political and social) because of an increasing phenomenon of competitive interactions between
governments (Pitlik, 2007).
4
From a theoretical point of view, Copeland and Taylor (2005) put into light the conditions of emergence of one
kind of complementarity between countries’ strategies using a computable general equilibrium model.
5
An alternative game is the one in abatement (Barrett, 1994).
2
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The aim of this paper is to show that the assumption on the nature of the interactions between
countries has fundamental impacts on the conditions of existence and the static comparative
properties of the Nash equilibria of the game. We thus provide an exhaustive analysis of all
the possible equilibria and we study their respective static comparative properties. In
particular the consequences in terms of pollution are not the same when considering 2 or 200
countries. The scale of the problem will thus influence individual and global emission levels
as well as countries’ payoff. Existing studies, such as the one by Finus (2001), provide results
that overlap with the ones in this paper. Nonetheless the latter rely on methods based on the
implicit function theorem and signing derivatives.6 In addition the case with multiple
equilibria is systematically dismissed. The originality of our work relies on the use of lattice
methods. This methodology is particularly suited to establish strong static comparative results
and relies on minimal assumptions relative to the traditional approach (Milgrom, Roberts,
1994; Amir, Lambson, 2000).7 We are able to compare equilibria eschewing restrictive
assumptions such as quasi-concave payoff functions, existence or uniqueness of equilibrium.
Focusing on the global structure of the equilibrium set, we compare the extreme equilibria
showing how the behaviours predicted change with changing the exogenous parameters of the
model.
Formally, the analysis relies on the sign of the cross partial derivative of the payoff function
relative to the strategic variables of the model.8 Because of the definition of the game, this
sign is directly connected with the sense of evolution of the gross marginal benefit countries
get from their own emissions. When gross marginal benefits are decreasing, countries’
strategies are globally complementary and the game always has at least one pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. The traditional framework of the literature belongs to this alternative. We
also show that the problem can become particularly serious when reinforcement effects exist
between economic activity levels, i.e. when strategies are such that each country chooses its
emission level as high as the one of the others is high. In this perspective, a first step for
international cooperation could be to coordinate on the lowest individual emissions levels
leading to the highest payoff levels. On the contrary, when gross marginal benefits are
increasing, countries’ strategies are globally substitutable or strongly substitutable. In this
case we have to define stronger conditions in order to ensure the equilibrium existence in the
game. Moreover, even if it’s commonly admitted that the problem gets worse with the number
of interacting countries, we show that this assertion is not always true, _which is questionable
on an environmental ground. Finally, under both alternatives, the perception countries have of
the environmental damages relative to the benefit of their emissions also plays a role in the
determination of individual emission levels.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the global emission
game and provides fundamental assumptions on countries’ payoff functions and strategy sets.
Section 3 defines the conditions of existence of equilibrium in a purely non cooperative
framework whereas section 4 provides several results of static comparative relative to the
exogenous parameter of the model. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the definitions
and theorems needed for our approach such that the paper is self-contained and Appendix B
provides the proofs of the propositions.

6

Based on the implicit function theorem, static comparative conclusions are only valid locally.
For example, analyses based on the implicit function theorem are not able to provide conclusions in the
presence of non-convexities or multiple equilibria.
8
The assumption of derivability is only made for convenience and does not constitute a limit for the majority of
the results presented.
7
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2. The global emission game: fundamental functions and
assumptions
In this section we briefly present the game as it appears traditionally in the literature and then
we provide an alternative version for the sake of our purpose. We consider identical
countries with N = {1, ..., n}. Linked to economic activities, each of them emits GHGs,
,
that mix uniformly in the atmosphere. In its most general form, the payoff function of country
, , is expressed as the difference between the benefits of its own emissions,
, and the
damages linked to global emissions, ∑
. The strategic choice made by a country is
thus its emission level.9 Given symmetry, we note in the following , and respectively the
emission level of the country under consideration, the aggregate emission level of the ( – 1)
other countries, and the global emission level, i.e.
. A country’s payoff function is
thus of the form:
.

(1)

The only assumptions we do for the while on the benefit and the damage functions are the
following:
and
; i.e. countries’ benefits are an increasing function of
their own emissions whereas damages are an increasing function of global emissions. It’s
through this latter assumption that the problem at stake gets its global character.
In what follows
is defined on the strategy set
which is a compact interval of
the real positive. We define as the maximal capacity of pollution of a country or also as its
maximum production capacity. Decisions are supposed to be taken simultaneously: each
country determines its emission level maximizing its payoff function and given the
anticipation he has on the strategies adopted by the others. From equation (1), we define
as the individual best-response correspondence of the country under consideration.
is
the set of solutions of the problem of maximization of one country. At an equilibrium point,
the conjectures of all countries coincide: given the strategy of the others, none has an
incentive to change its strategy unilaterally. Note also that the assumption of symmetric
countries does not alter our conclusions, the central idea being the existence of strategic
interdependencies between countries: the damage a country bears depends on its own strategy
and on the aggregated strategy of the ( – 1) other countries, but the distribution of emission
levels among countries has no interest.
To extend the existing framework of the literature and to undertake a typology of countries’
strategies, we need to consider a monotone transformation of the game. This procedure is
borrowed from Amir and Lambson (2000) and relies on the aggregative nature of the
problem.10 In the alternative game, the country under consideration chooses
given
the aggregated strategy of the ( – 1) other countries y. The payoff function (1) can be rewrite
as:
̃

.

(2)

In this case, the best-response correspondence of a country is denoted
. Our analysis then
relies on the sign of the cross partial derivative of the payoff function (2) with regard to and
9

The choice variable can also be modelled as abatement. Nonetheless even if both choices are strategically
equivalent, the game in abatement requires a roundabout way to the game in emissions to check for consistency
(Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006).
10
This argument is originally the one of Selten (1970). Formally, this monotone transformation of countries’
payoff function lets us check Topkis Theorem conditions (Theorem A1 in Appendix A), keeping identical the
properties of the equilibrium set.
4
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. If we note
this derivative, its sign (positive or negative) lets us split the analysis into
two distinct cases: if
, then z and y are complementary (best-responses are upward
sloping); if
, z and y are substitutable (best-responses are downward sloping). In the
first case it means that there exists reinforcement effect between countries strategies; the
higher the aggregated emission level of the ( – 1) other countries, the higher the emission
level of the country under consideration. In the second case, the higher the emission level ,
the lower the global emissions (keeping in mind the constraint
).
Given ̃
,
. Both are defined on the set
.
Because of the linear relationship between x, y and z, the sign of
is directly linked to the
shape of the benefit function: either strictly concave or strictly convex. The object of the
analysis is to define, in each case, the properties of the best-response correspondences, i.e. the
existence and the static comparative properties of equilibria. For this purpose, the assumption
H0 below will be in effect throughout all the paper:
Assumption H0: Both functions
and
are twice continuously
differentiable and strictly increasing in their respective argument.
This assumption is not the most general.11 Nonetheless differentiable functions allow us to
simplify the exposition without losing any economic interpretations. Moreover, as Nash
equilibria are not necessarily unique, we define , ,
and
as respectively, the set of
equilibrium emission levels for one country, the set of equilibrium emission levels of the
–
other countries, the set of equilibrium global emissions and finally, the set of
equilibrium individual payoffs. When the equilibrium point is unique we use the
corresponding lower-case letter. The minimum and maximum elements of a set, when they
exist, are underlined and highlighted. For example,
and are respectively the lowest and
the highest equilibrium global emission levels of the set . The same notations are adopted
for the other equilibrium sets ,
and .

3. Characterization of the solutions in the non-cooperative case
In this section we characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the global emission game, i.e.
when each country maximises its own payoff given the strategy adopted by the others. This
scenario is known as the purely non-cooperative framework or status quo. The analysis is split
into two: strategic interactions between countries are either globally complementary (
on ) or globally substitutable (
on ). This section relies on the property that the set
of equilibria of a non-cooperative game coincides with the set of fixed-points of the vector of
individual best-response correspondences (Lemma A.2_Topkis, 1998). We thus have to check
if the latter has fixed-points.
3.1 The global complementarity case
When
is strictly positive on the set , countries’ benefits functions are concave, meaning
that the benefits countries have of their own emissions increase at a decreasing rate. This
assumption reflects deceasing returns to scale in the activities of production or decreasing

11

The central assumption to establish our result is that countries’ payoff functions have increasing or decreasing
differences in
(Topkis, 1978). A definition of this property is provided in appendix A (Definition A.1). In
the differentiable case, this assumption coincides with the sign, respectively positive or negative, of the second
cross partial derivative of the objective-function (Lemma A.1).
5
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marginal utility in the consumption of produced goods.12 In this case, the first proposition
establishes a general result of existence relying on a direct application of the theorems
presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1:
If
is strictly positive on the set , then the global emission game has at least one
symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and no asymmetric one.
A characteristic of the games with strategic complementarities is that they always possess at
least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium even if payoff functions are not quasi-concave in
their argument. The intuitions behind this first result are the following:
i)

As soon as the benefit function is strictly concave, the best-response correspondence of
each country is increasing in its argument (Theorem A.1_Topkis, 1978), i.e. any
solution
of the maximisation problem (2) is increasing in y. The existence of
equilibria then relies on Tarski’s fixed-point theorem (Theorem A.2_Tarski, 1955). So,
independently of the shape of the damage function, the global emission game always
has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium as soon as marginal benefits of
emissions are decreasing.
ii) With the assumption of symmetry, we show that a country’s best-response is always to
pollute as much as each of the (n – 1) other countries. A second property of the bestresponse correspondence is that if the latter possesses a fixed-point, then it’s a
symmetric equilibrium point.
iii) Given the relationship between x and z (i.e. z = x + y), any particular selection in the set
of individual best-response correspondences of a country
has a slope strictly larger
than
.
To characterize further the set of equilibria, we need to specify the form of the damage
function. In fact the latter determines the nature of the interactions at the individual level
(contrary to the benefit function that characterizes the interactions at the global level). In this
purpose, two independent subsets of conditions are provided through Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2:
In addition to
on , if the damage function is convex, then the individual bestresponse correspondence
is decreasing in and there exist only one pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
With a convex damage function, the harms caused to the environment because of global
emissions increase at an increasing rate. The underlying idea is that the auto-purification
capacity of environmental systems decreases at higher contamination levels. Nonetheless we
do not consider here the case in which the system would collapse because of global emissions.
As a consequence of Proposition 1, a country individual best-response correspondence
is non-empty and has a slope larger than
. The convexity of the damage function is then a
sufficient condition for
to be decreasing in . The slope of the individual best-response
correspondence has thus 0 as an upper bound. It means that a country chooses its emission
level as low as the one of the ( – ) other countries is high.

12

If the benefit function is interpreted as the opportunity cost of abatement, the concavity reflects that abatement
policies require increasingly sophisticated and costly technologies with the level of effort undertaken; or, in other
words, decreasing returns in abatement technologies.
6
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Assumptions of Proposition 2 are in fact the traditional ones in the global emission game: a
concave benefit function and a convex damage function, together insuring a concave payoff
function and continuous individual best-responses. Another important property is the
existence of unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Because of these nice properties, the
assumptions of Proposition 2 are the most frequent in the literature studying the stability of
international environmental agreements. The fact remains that when
on another
case is conceivable: the one where
is increasing in . To our knowledge this case has
not yet been exploited in the literature.
Proposition 3:
In addition to
on , if the damage function is strictly concave, then the maximal and
minimal selections of the individual best-response correspondence
are strictly
increasing in and there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
When the damage function is strictly concave, the cross partial derivative of
with
regard to and is strictly positive. Consequently the individual best-response of a country
is strictly increasing in its argument and has in particular a higher and a smaller element,
respectively denoted by
and
(Theorem A.1_Topkis, 1978). In that respect a
country will choose an emission level as high as the one of the others is high. The existence of
a higher and a smaller equilibrium point is a direct consequence of Tarski’s fixed-point
theorem (Theorem A.2_Tarski, 1955).
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the set of equilibria also possesses a noteworthy
order property: as the global emission game is a game of negative externality, the payoffs are
the highest (the lowest) when countries coordinate on the lowest (the highest) equilibrium
emission levels. In other words, the smallest equilibrium
is Pareto superior, whereas the
highest equilibrium

is Pareto inferior (Theorem A.3_Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).

Three additional remarks can be made:
i)

The multiplicity of equilibria is directly linked to the increasing individual bestresponse correspondences. Nonetheless this necessary condition is not sufficient: the
slope of the individual best-responses must also be bigger than one in at least one
equilibrium point (Cooper, 1999, p. 21).

ii) As a corollary of the previous remark, the equilibrium point can be unique in a game
with strategic complementarities. An easy way to check this property is to have
continuous best-responses with a slope everywhere less than one. This point is of
particular interest to study the formation of international environmental agreement
under strategic complementarities (Heugues, 2012).
iii) Given the linearity relation between the variables of the model (z = x + y), if the global
emission game presents strategic complementarities in
, it must be the case in
. The assumptions on the benefit and damage functions are redundant or say in
other words, if the damage function is concave, the benefit function must be concave as
well. If not, the evolutions of equilibrium individual and global emission levels would
go in incompatible directions. This point is further developed in the next subsection.
Further economic interpretations:
The idea of complementarity in the global emission game means that a country has a higher
utility of the increase of its activity of consumption and production, the higher the global
7
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activity level of the others. The existence of reinforcement effects thus induces always higher
emissions both at individual and global levels. This idea relies on a particular form of
diffusion of consumption and production paths between countries and is made conceivable
because of the globalization of economic activities (World Trade Organization, 1999; UNEP,
2012). Hence international trade liberalization has led to a greater scale of economic
activities, stimulating the production of goods and services, consumption and transportation
services (Copeland and Taylor, 2005).13
The kind of complementarity postulated in Proposition 3 lies on the less usual assumption that
damages increase at a decreasing rate with global pollution. Yet, if the total costs of climate
change represents the effects of increased climate variability and the costs of adaptation to the
new climatic conditions, this approach has proved to be more coherent with the stylized belief
that damage will remain relatively small (i.e. there will be no economic disruption) and better
takes into account inertia of energy systems (Dumas and Ha Duong, 2005).14
The existence of reinforcement effects between countries’ strategies can lead to a multiplicity
of stable economic situations. Countries can thus coordinate on different economic activity
levels. Nonetheless, in a purely non-cooperative context, the highest levels generate the
strongest externalities and lead to the lowest welfare levels: payoffs are Pareto-ordered and
inverse related with the levels of emissions. A first step to cooperation between countries
could be to coordinate on the lowest emission levels.
The next subsection is devoted to the case of globally substitutable strategies. Now, bestresponse strategies evolve in opposite directions: a country chooses a higher global emission
level for lower aggregated emissions of the – other countries. This condition underlines a
case where countries face strong national scale economies.
3.2 The case of global substitutability
When
is strictly negative on the set φ, emission levels z and y vary in opposite direction:
the country under consideration will choose z as low as the aggregated emission level of the
– other countries is already high. Here best-response correspondences are strictly
decreasing with the aggregated strategy of the others. Yet, in this case there is no general
fixed-point theorem for games with more than two players: decreasing best-response
correspondences do not necessarily imply that the game has an equilibrium point. To insure
this existence we have to formulate stronger assumptions; to carry out the analysis we also
have to check for the global consistency of the game imposed by the linear relationship
between variables. We can distinguish two scenarios: the first is inspired from the natural
monopoly theory: only one country is polluting; the second requires imposing a stronger
assumption for existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the N-country game.
The convex benefit function supports the idea that countries enjoy economies of scale in their
activities of production: the mean production cost of a country decreases with the level of its
activities. In this framework the first scenario relies on an economic efficiency principle that
the global production should be realised by one country rather than shared among several.
Considering the N-country global emission game, we can thus establish the existence of an
13

In international trade theory the effect at hand is known as the scale effect. Nonetheless the latter comes up
against competition from the technique effect, i.e. a trade liberalization that raises the scale of economic activity
will also lower the dirtiness of production techniques. The full environmental impact can only be resolved
through careful empirical investigation.
14
See Heugues (2012) for further support of such an assumption in the global emission game.
8
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equilibrium point such that one country is polluting whereas the – others emit 0. This
set-up is extended to the case where
countries have strictly positive emissions denoted
and the best-response of the –
others is to pollute 0.
The second scenario is such that the countries are active. A sufficient condition for
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the N-country game is to assume quasiconcave payoff functions. This assumption guaranties continuous best-response functions and
then the existence of an interior solution. To establish this result, we define ̅ as the
aggregated emissions threshold of the – countries beyond which the country under
consideration chooses not to pollute. This threshold is such that it equalizes marginal benefit
and marginal damage for
. In other terms
with
.
Proposition 4 establishes the conditions of existence of a Nash equilibrium for each scenario.
In each case, we show that the equilibrium point is unique.
Proposition 4:
If
is strictly negative on the set φ, then the damage function is necessarily strictly convex
and we check the three following points:
a. For any
, if a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game with countries exists,
then it’s unique (to a permutation of the countries) and such that each of the
countries emits , whereas the –
other countries emit nothing. In particular, if
one country only emits (
), then the game with countries always admits one
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
b. If the individual payoff function f(x, y) is strictly quasi-concave in x for all
̅,
then there exists only one symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
c. No other pure-strategy Nash equilibrium than the ones determined at point a) and b)
exists.
The negative sign of
has several consequences: first of all, individual best-response
correspondences
are strongly decreasing with a slope upper bounded by
. It means
that if one country undertakes to reduce its individual emissions, the other – countries
will increase their own emissions such that totally cancelling the initial effort undertaken.
This framework has been studied in particular by Hoel (1991), i.e. when the unilateral
implementation of abatement policies by a subgroup of countries leads to a higher global
emission level.
Second, if the game has strategic substitutability at the global level, this property has also to
be true at the individual level because of the linear relationship between the variables.
Formally, this constraint requires the strict convexity of the damage function.15
Finally the convex benefit function is the expression of strong economies of scale at the
national level. Unlike Proposition 3, these scale effects are proper to each country and do not
diffuse. In such a case, the competition between countries is very strong and can be such that
activities are limited to a subset of them.
Whatever the nature of the interactions between countries, it’s possible to establish conditions
under which the global emission game holds Nash equilibria. The fundamental element is the
slope of the best-response correspondence
. The next section is devoted to the static
comparative properties of these equilibria with regard to two exogenous parameters: the
15

Because

, if

is strongly decreasing in , then

must be decreasing in

as well.
9
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number of countries involved in the game and the perception they have of the seriousness of
the problem.

4. Parametric properties of non-cooperative solutions
In this section we are interested in the static comparative properties of the equilibria with
regard to the exogenous parameters of the model. These properties differ according to the set
of assumptions defined above. Note that when the set of equilibria has more than one element,
the static comparative properties will be true only for the smallest and the highest element.
When the game has strategic complementarities, these properties are easy to provide thanks to
a theorem by Milgrom and Roberts (Theorem A.5_Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). When
strategies are strong substitutes, two contradictory effects are in place. We then rely on
another argument provided by Sobel (Theorem A.4_Sobel, 1988) and under which the
conclusions of Theorem A.5 are true.
4.1 Impact of the number of countries involved in the problem
We first study the impact of the number of countries involved in the environmental problem.
The consequences in terms of pollution are not the same when considering 2 or 200 countries.
The scale of the problem will thus influence individual and global emission levels as well as
countries’ payoff. The fundamental question here is: how the number of the other countries
affects a country’s strategic behaviour? In this section we determine how evolve equilibrium
emission levels and payoffs when the number of countries increases.
Formally, the underlying parameter does not appear explicitly in a country’s payoff function.
Consequently the static comparative results are established using the structural properties of
the game and the assumption of symmetric countries becomes fundamental. Proposition 5
below establishes the static comparative properties of the non-cooperative equilibria when
countries have globally strategic complementarities.
Proposition 5:
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the equilibria of the global emission game are such
that:
a) Maximum and minimum equilibrium aggregated emission levels of the – other
countries,
and , are strictly increasing in n;
b) Maximum and minimum equilibrium global emission levels,
and , are strictly
increasing in n
c) Maximum and minimum equilibrium payoffs, and , are strictly decreasing in n.
Under Proposition 1, there exists at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium point and no
asymmetric one. Given Proposition 5, the latter is such that the larger is the number of
interacting countries, the higher the aggregated and the global emission levels. Moreover if
multiple, equilibria are Pareto ordered with the smallest equilibrium point
being Pareto
superior. Nonetheless we cannot conclude here on the static comparative properties of
equilibrium individual emissions levels. The latter rely on the form of the damage function.
Both cases are tackled through Propositions 6 and 7. Note also that the larger the number of
countries involved, the lower the welfare of each country. This relation is true whatever the
nature of the interactions between countries; but, under the particular case of Proposition 5,
this property is linked to the increased size of the global damages when n increases.

10
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Proposition 6:
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the unique equilibrium point of the global emission
game is such that the individual emission level x* is strictly decreasing in n.
This proposal relies on the decreasing property of individual best-response functions. Hence
the unique equilibrium point is such that individual emission levels are strictly decreasing
with the number of countries involved. In other words, each country determines its activity
level as low as the number of its partners is important. This conclusion relies on the idea of
strategic substitutability at the individual scale that induces a certain degree of competition
between countries. Nonetheless at the global scale, we always check that total emissions are
increasing with n: global emissions increase with the number of interacting countries but less
than proportionally.
Proposition 7:
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the set of equilibrium individual emission levels is
such that the extreme selections
and are strictly increasing in n.
Similarly, Proposition 7 relies on the increasing property of the individual best-response
functions. In this case, there exists a multiplicity of Pareto ordered equilibria. The latter are
such that a country has higher activity levels for larger numbers of interacting partners. This
result is a direct consequence of the property of strategic complementarity observed at the
individual scale. It can be interpreted as a phenomenon of emulation or of reinforcement
between countries’ strategies. At the global scale, we check that the global emissions increase
more than proportionally with the number of countries involved.
Finally the next proposal establishes the static comparative properties of the non-cooperative
solutions when strategies are globally substitutable. Contrary to the preceding cases, here
payoff functions are decreasing with n because the size of the cake for each decreases with the
increased number of countries.
Proposition 8:
a) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4a), the asymmetric equilibrium point such that
is invariant with ;
b) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4b), the symmetric equilibrium point is such
that the equilibrium aggregated emission level of the –
other countries
is
strictly increasing in , whereas equilibrium individual and global emission levels,
and , and the equilibrium welfare level , are strictly decreasing in .
Intriguingly here, the externalities because of the activities of consumption and production are
not the stronger, the larger the number of countries involved. This conclusion raises the
question of the relevance of this set of assumptions with regard to empirical observations.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, countries are involved in a strong competition in the
fixation of their activity levels. In the first scenario in which only a subset of them has
positive emissions, the others emitting 0, the equilibrium activity level is independent of n.
The intuition is clear for the corner solution with one polluting country (m = 1) looking at its
payoff function with its strategy as a sole argument. The same reasoning is true with m
countries, 1 < m < n, with strictly positive emissions.
In the second scenario, we are on the interior of the best-response functions, which are
strongly decreasing. This implies that, at the equilibrium point, a country emission level is the
lower, the larger the number of interacting countries. Finally, the decrease of the global
11
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emission level with n is because individual emissions levels decrease more than
proportionally with n.
Further economic interpretations:
Except from Proposition 7, the results established in this section are in accordance with the
ones of the economic theory presented through particular cases. Thus they constitute a
substantial generalization of the existing static comparative results.
Because of its originality Proposition 7 calls for more comments. To our knowledge, the idea
that countries could display strategic complementarity at the individual scale in their activities
of consumption and production has not yet been exploited. In this respect, we can interpret
countries as trading partners: the global emission level is then the higher, the larger the
number of interacting countries. The intensification of trade relations between countries leads
to increased global emissions, giving all its sense to the problem of GHG accumulation in the
atmosphere. Relying on the international trade theory, trade liberalization generally leads to a
higher global welfare for the countries involved in the process (even in the case of symmetric
countries). With our model this point is observed through the increased benefits linked to the
existence of reinforcement effects between countries strategies. Nonetheless this result is
reversed taking into account the impact of human activities on the environment. Hence
considering both the increased benefits and damages, the increased levels of activities do not
necessarily lead to increased welfare levels. It remains that if countries are able to coordinate
on lower emission levels, the process is welfare improving.
In the next subsection we consider the impact of the benefit-cost parameter. The latter
expresses how countries balance the potential damages linked to climate change. We thus
study the impact of such a parameter on countries’ strategy and payoff.
4.2 Impact of the perception of the environmental damages
Another parameter appearing when exploiting the global emission game is the benefit-cost
parameter generally denoted . It consists in considering the weight of the benefits linked to
the polluting activities relative to their costs .
and
are thus two parameters
generally weighted respectively the benefit and the damage functions and is defined as
. To establish our results, we consider the countries’ payoff function ̃
defined on the set
and with ̃
.
Considering the same approach as in the existing literature, we show that all equilibrium
emission levels are increasing in . This claim is true whatever the nature of the interactions
between countries. Nonetheless there is no clear cut static comparative result with regard to
countries’ payoffs for this parameter.
Proposition 9:
Assuming the payoff function ̃
, the three following points are true:
a) Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, maximum and minimum equilibrium emission
levels, Z* andZ*, Y* andY*, X* andX* are all increasing in γ;
b) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4a), equilibrium emission levels of the m active
countries zm, xm and ym are increasing in γ;
c) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4b), if the strategy set is ascending in γ, the
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is such that equilibrium emission levels z*, x* and
y* are increasing in γ.
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Whatever the set of assumptions defined above, if a country’s strategy set is ascending in γ,
then equilibrium individual, aggregated and global emission levels are all increasing in .
Even if this proposition seems trivial the proof relies on different properties of the game for
each point, i.e. when countries present globally strategic complementarity or substitutability.
Hence whatever the nature of the interaction, equilibrium emission levels are increasing in the
benefit-cost ratio: the more a country weights the benefits of its economic activities relative to
their environmental impacts, the larger its individual emissions. Alternatively, we can also say
that the larger is , the more countries take care of the part of their payment that is
independent of the strategy of the others. Yet the latter is increasing with the individual
emission level. On the contrary, if the perception of the environmental damages increases
relative to the opportunity cost of abatement ( is decreasing), individual emission levels will
be lower. The nature of the interactions between countries intervenes more when countries
become sensitive to the strategy adopted by the others. In particular countries will be more
reluctant to abate in the case of substitutable strategies.
To conclude on these results of static comparative, we can add that the way equilibrium
emission levels and payoffs evolve rely also on the nature of the interactions between
countries. These results suggest that countries will not be urged similarly with regard to the
problem of GHG accumulation in the atmosphere and the increase of the environmental
externalities. It’s in particular the case when reinforcement effects exist between countries
polluting activities. The assumptions on the benefit and the damage functions thus play an
important role on the final issue of the game.
In the purely non-cooperative game, countries only consider two things in order to determine
the level of their strategy: i) the strategy of the others and ii) the negative impact they bear
because of their own emissions. Yet these externalities are also beard by the other countries.
The resultant of the maximization of private interests is thus non optimal from a global point
of view.

5. Conclusion
The analysis herein relies essentially on the sign of the second cross order derivative of payoff
functions. By this way, we are able to provide an exhaustive presentation of all the possible
interactions between countries and their consequences in terms of GHG accumulation in the
atmosphere. These results thus form a typology of States’ strategic behaviours in the case of a
global externality such as the problem of climate change.
Through the implementation of environmental policies, countries behave strategically: one
reason is that these policies determine in a sense their levels of activities and thus are at stake
in their development and growth strategies. In the case of decreasing returns in the production
activities (B′′ < 0 or
), the global emission level can be all the higher as reinforcement
effects between countries’ strategies exist. When strategies are strongly complementary, each
country determines its activity level as high as the one of the others is also high. A
multiplicity of stable economic situations is then possible. Taking into account the impacts of
human activities on the environment, a first step for countries should be to coordinate on the
lowest individual emission levels, the latter inducing the higher payoffs.
Nonetheless, it’s clear that even the Pareto superior non-cooperative equilibrium is not
enough to provide the public good “environment” at a globally optimal level. Again countries
determine too high individual emission levels when they do not consider the impact of their
emissions on the others. Unfortunately, even if the globally optimal solution is the one leading
13
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to the highest aggregated payoff, it’s not stable: we can show that each country individually
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. An extension of this paper would be to consider the
profitability and stability of a partial agreement according to the nature of the interactions
between countries.
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Appendix A: Definitions and main theorems of lattice theory
Definitions and theorems introduced in this appendix are a simplified version of the original ones issued from
lattice theory. We take the parameter and action sets, respectively and , to be compact subsets of the positive
real, and Xt a correspondence from to , with being the set of feasible actions when the parameter is .
Definition A.1: A function

f : X  T  R has [strictly] increasing differences in

t   t : f ( x, t )  f ( x, t )   f ( x, t )  f ( x, t ) .

Lemma A.1 (see Amir 2005 for a proof): If
differences in

is twice continuously differentiable,



if and only if  f ( x, t ) / xt   0 for all
2

if for all x  

x and

has [strictly] increasing

and .

For functions defined on
increasing differences is equivalent to supermodularity, so the two terms can be
used interchangeably (Amir, 2005).
Definition A.2: A function f : X  R is upper semi-continuous in

if lim supx  x0 f ( x)  f ( x0 ) . A function

is upper semi-continuous if it is for all x0  X .





Definition A.3: For t  R , let X t  g (t ), h(t )  R , with
with

.

is ascending [descending] in if

g () and h() being real valued functions and

g () and h() are increasing [decreasing] in .

A non-cooperative game is a triple
consisting in a non-empty set of players , a set of feasible
i n
individual strategies , and a payoff function defined on i 1 X i for each player in .
Definition A.4: A non-cooperative game
is a supermodular game if each set of feasible strategies
is a compact set of the Euclidian space and if each payoff function f i ( xi , xi ) is upper semi-continuous in
and has increasing differences in

for all players

i, j  N and i  j .

Lemma A.2 (Topkis, 1998, chapter 4): The set of all equilibrium points for a non-cooperative game
is identical to the set of fixed-points for the joint best-response correspondence, i.e. the direct product of players’
individual best-response correspondences.
Theorem A.1 (Topkis, 1978): If f : X  T  R is upper semi-continuous and has increasing [decreasing]
differences in
, and is ascending [descending] in , then the maximum and minimum selections of
x * (t )  arg max xXt f ( x, t ) are increasing [decreasing] in . If has strictly increasing [decreasing]
differences in

, then the conclusion of the theorem holds for every selection of
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Theorem A.2 (Tarsky, 1955): Let be an non-empty and compact interval of the Euclidian space and let
f : X  X be an increasing function ( f ( x)  f ( y ) if x  y ). Then the set of fixed-points of is nonempty and contains a smallest and a largest element in .
Theorem A.3 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): Let and denote the smallest and largest elements of , and
suppose and are two equilibria with y  z . (i) If f i ( x i , x i ) is increasing in
, then f i ( y )  f i ( z ) . (ii)
If f i ( x i , x i ) is decreasing in
, then f i ( y )  f i ( z ) . If the condition in (i) holds for some subset of players
and the condition in (ii) holds for the remainder
, then is the most preferred equilibrium for the players
in , and the least preferred for the remaining players. Similarly is the least preferred by the players in ,
and the most preferred by the remaining players.
Theorem A.4 (Sobel, 1988): Let be an non-empty and compact interval of the positive real and let
and such that
is strictly increasing in . Then the
f t : X  X a strictly increasing function
lowest and the highest fixed-point of

are strictly increasing in .

Theorem A.5 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): For any
and
supermodular and if f i ( xi , x i , t ) has increasing differences in

a partially ordered set, if the game is
for each
, then the smallest and the

highest equilibrium points are increasing functions of .

Appendix B: Mathematical proofs
This appendix provides the proofs of the propositions made in the framework of the global emission game with
symmetric countries. The proofs of Propositions 1 to 4 are the consequence of the approach borrowed from
Amir and Lambson (2000). The latter studies the case of a Cournot oligopoly. Our analysis differs with respect
to the underlying objective-function, the issue at stake and the conclusions.
For the sake of our purpose, we assume that
and
are twice continuously differentiable
and strictly increasing. Considering the payoff function
, a country best-response
correspondence is defined for any ,
, such that
. Similarly
considering ̃
, the set of solutions of the maximization problem is
̃
defined on the strategy space is
.
The existence of symmetric equilibria in the game relies on the definition of the joint best-response
correspondence (Topkis, 1998). Because of the assumption of symmetric countries, the latter denoted C(∙) is
defined as follows:
(B.1)
The variable is a country’s best-response given the cumulated emissions of the
other countries. As
and

, it’s easy to check that (

)

. A fixed-point of C(∙)

is thus a symmetric Nash equilibrium such that
with
: a country chooses
its emission level as high as the one of each of the
other countries. Then the purpose of Propositions 1 to
4 is to establish the conditions of existence of fixed-points of C(∙).
Proof of Proposition 1:
 First we show that there exists at least one symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium:
The proof relies on a direct application of Theorems A.1 and A.2. When
, a country’s payoff function ̃
is upper semi-continuous and has strictly increasing differences in
on the set φ. Any selection of
is
thus increasing in . As
, it’s equivalent to say that any selection of the joint best-response
correspondence C(∙) defined by equation (B.1) is also increasing in . Given Tarski’s fixed-point theorem we
conclude that C(∙) has a fixed-point which is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
 Second we show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium point:
When
, Theorem A.1 lets us conclude that any selection of
is increasing in . To show that there
is no asymmetric equilibrium, it’s enough to show that
is strictly increasing in , i.e. for any
,
such that 

with being a best-response to . By contradiction, suppose that there exists ̃
such
that ̃
̃
with
. If ̃
and ̃
are interior solutions of the maximization problem
of ̃
, both check the first order conditions:
̃
( ̃
)
,
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As ̃

̃

, it follows that:

,
And:
As ̃ is strictly increasing in , ̃
is true for any
belonging to this interval. Considering the limit of (B.2) when

.
. Equation (B.2) is then true for any
, we have:

B ( z  y1 )  B ( z  y 2 )
 0.
y 2  y1
y 2  y1
lim

(B.3) is equivalent to
, which is in contradiction with
there is no asymmetric equilibrium point.

(B.2)

(B.3)

on φ. Hence ̃ is strictly increasing and

Proof of Proposition 2:
When
and the damage function is convex, the best-response correspondence
is an increasing
function of and there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
 We first show that the slope of
belongs to the interval
:
Given Proposition 1,
implies that any selection of
is strictly increasing in , i.e.
. As
, any selection of
has a slope larger than
:
.
When the damage function is convex,
has decreasing differences in
:
.
Hence, the extreme selections of
are decreasing in (Theorem A.1):
.
As a whole, the slope of any selection of
belong to
. The continuity of the best-response function is
linked to the fact that any best-response with a slope lower bounded cannot jump down. Yet,
being
decreasing in implies that it doesn’t have jump up and so no jump at all. Under the assumptions of Proposition
2, a country best-response is a continuous function.
 We then show that the equilibrium is unique:
∑
∑
By contradiction, suppose two fixed-points and
such that
(a). As any selection of
is strictly increasing in , this assumption implies that
(b). Yet, as
is decreasing in , the
∑
inequality (b) implies that
. Consequently, as countries are symmetric, ∑
(c) and as
is
strictly increasing in ,
(d). Combining conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d) implies that
. Under the
assumptions of Proposition 2, the Nash equilibrium of the game is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3:
When
and the damage function is strictly concave, the proof of existence is a direct application of
Theorems A.1 and A.2. When the damage function is strictly concave the payoff function
has strictly
increasing differences in
. Then best-response correspondences are non-empty and minimal and maximal
selections of
,
and , are strictly increasing in . Then Tarski’s fixed-point theorem ensures the
existence of at least one fixed-point and thus of one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the global emission
game.
The proof of Proposition 4 requires an intermediate result expressed through Lemma B.1. This lemma
establishes that if
and as soon as the graph of
does not intersect the first diagonal, any selection
in the set
is strictly decreasing in . Subsequently, once
intersects the first diagonal, both coincide.
Figure B.1 below provides an illustration. The proof of the lemma is the one of Amir and Lambson (2000)
adapting the notations to the global emission game.
Lemma B.1 (Amir and Lambson, 2000):
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, any selection of
and such that
; and
for

is strictly decreasing in
.

for

, with
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Figure B.1: Graph a selection of

when

.

Proof:
i) First we show that any selection of
is strictly decreasing in :
As
,
has strictly decreasing differences in
. Yet the set of accessible strategies
is ascending and not descending in as required for the application of Theorem A.1. Relying
on the Rectangle Monotonicity Property (Amir and Lambson, 2000), we can nevertheless conclude that
every selection of
is strictly decreasing in whenever its graph is contained in a rectangle that
lies entirely in the strategy set φ. In other words, for
with
,
, if the four
points
,
,
and
are contained in φ, then
.
ii) We show that if
for all
, then
for
:
Once the graph of
intersects the first diagonal at the point , both coincide for every value
, i.e.
, for any
. The proof is established by contradiction. First, we can exclude all
the values
as the accessible strategy set for is
with
. Consequently suppose that
and assume that ̃
with ~
, the maximum
z  Z * ( ~y ) and such that ~
z~
y . As
̃
utility a country can get in response to
is
. Yet,
̃ ̃
because
by assumption (H0) the benefit function is strictly increasing in the individual emission level:
̃ ̃
with
and
. Hence
̃ ̃
and
̃ ̃
is in contradiction with
since the strategy ̃ ̃ in response to
leads to a
higher payoff. We can thus conclude
for
.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 identifies two independent conditions under which there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium when
. The first condition is such that a country is polluting alone
, the others
choosing to emit nothing. The second option is to assume the strict quasi-concavity of the payoff
functions
in for any
̅ with ̅
(
)
.
 Proof of Proposition 4.a)
On the interval
,
is strictly decreasing in (Lemma B.1) and
is well defined: in a game with
substitutable strategies, if
is the emission level of a country when it is the sole to pollute,
is the highest
emission level it can choose (of course we need to have
).
Moreover, considering the individual best-response correspondence,
. Under the assumptions
of Proposition 4.a) and given Lemma B.1,
implying
. Let and be two
points on the graph of
, such that x1  X ( y1 ) and x 2  X ( y 2 ) with
. Then for any
,
the slope of the straight line joining and is such that
.
Nonetheless, if
is a country’s equilibrium emission level when it is the sole to pollute, then we have to check
simultaneously
and
, i.e. others’ best-response must also be not to pollute. By definition
is true. To show that
, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose x’
such that
.
We thus have:
.

(B.4)

Equation (B.4) contradicts the fact that every selection in
has a slope below
. Thus
.
The proof when
is identical. Nonetheless, the existence of an equilibrium point has to be assumed. The
reason is that best-responses are strongly decreasing and without quasi-concave payoff functions, C(∙) is not
necessarily defined. If C(∙) is defined and if it possesses a fixed-point, then the latter is the only one symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
 Proof of Proposition 4.b)
In this case we have to show that if a country’s payoff function is strictly quasi-concave in , then
is a
continuous function such that
for any
̅ with ̅
(
)
; and
for any
̅.
Quasi-concavity of the payoff function
implies the continuity of
. Yet
decreases at a rate
larger than 1 in absolute terms (as a consequence of Lemma B.1), from the highest emission level
to 0.
 First we show that 0  X ( y ) . The first order condition of the maximisation problem
̅ is
. This condition is also sufficient to have a global maximum given the quasi18
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concavity of
in . As
̅
,
satisfies the first order condition with equality.
Hence ̅ is the lowest level of for which
. Moreover, as
for
,
for any
̅.
 Then we show that there exists only a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is
symmetric if and only if
–
fulfill
– : a country’s best-response is to pollute as
much as each of the
others. Given the previous point,
and
– intersect for any
. Now uniqueness is the consequence that both functions are respectively decreasing and
increasing in for the values of previously defined.
 Proof of Proposition 4.c)
If there is another equilibrium point than the ones established in point a) and b) of Proposition 4, then the latter is
necessarily asymmetric. By contradiction, suppose the vector
of equilibrium individual emission
∑
levels with
the global emission level. An equilibrium point is asymmetric if at least to countries choose
different and strictly positive individual emission levels, i.e. suppose
with such that
,
. By definition, we have
, with
as
. The latter is in contradiction
with
strictly decreasing in when
. Hence, there is no asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5:
 Proof of Proposition 5.a)
We first show that
and , are strictly increasing in . The proof relies on Theorem A.4. Given Theorem A.1,
the extreme selections of the joint best-response correspondence, and , exist and are strictly increasing in .
As
is strictly increasing in ,
is strictly increasing in
. Given Theorem A.4, the
highest fixed-point of , is strictly increasing in . The proof with is identical and
is also strictly
increasing in .
 Proof of Proposition 5.b)
We show that and , are strictly increasing in . Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the variables and
are complementary, i.e. every selection in the set
is strictly increasing in . As
is strictly increasing
in , is also strictly increasing in . The argument is the same for the selection .
 Proof of Proposition 5.c)
Finally we show that
and , are decreasing in . Pollution being a negative externality, a country’s payoff
function is strictly decreasing in y. The highest payoff coincide with the lowest emission levels. As
,
and are equilibrium payoffs that correspond respectively to and . Hence, is a country’s payoff
function which react optimally to
. The reasoning is the same for
. Let
and be the equilibrium
individual emission level and the equilibrium payoff when countries are interacting in the global emission
game. Then we check:
( )
(
)
( )
Given the definition of a Nash equilibrium:
( )
(
)
The latter inequality tells us that
is not a best-response to
. Moreover, as
regarding point a) of Proposition 5, we also check:
(
)
(
)
(
)
In other words, this inequality relies on the fact that

is strictly increasing in n and

fn

is decreasing in

.

Now:
(
Thus we can conclude that

)

(
. Using

)

(

)

(

, we establish the proof for

)
.

Proof of Proposition 6:
With the convexity of the damage function, individual payoff functions
have decreasing differences in
. Extreme selections of
are thus decreasing in . As the equilibrium point is unique (Proposition 2),
the unique selection is such that
. As is decreasing in
and that
is strictly increasing in
(Proposition 5.a)), is strictly decreasing in . Consequently and evolve in opposite direction when
increases.
Proof of Proposition 7:
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With the strict concavity of the damage function, individual payoff functions
have strictly increasing
differences in
. Extreme selections of
are thus strictly increasing in (Proposition 3). As
and
and as and are strictly increasing in (Proposition 5.a)), individual emission levels
and

are strictly increasing in . Thus

and

evolve in the same direction as

and

as n increases.

Proof of Proposition 8:
a) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.a), the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is such that m countries
choose a positive emission level whereas the other
countries choose to emit nothing. Consequently,
individual emissions levels are invariant in n.
b) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.b), we first show that
is strictly increasing in n whereas
and are strictly decreasing in n using the definition of the joint best-response correspondence (equation B.1).
As –
is strictly increasing in n,
is strictly increasing in n . Given Theorem A.4, the unique fixed
point of
is thus strictly increasing in n.
In addition, the solution set
is strictly decreasing in y (Rectangle Monotonicity Property, see the proof of
Proposition 4). Hence,
strictly increasing in n implies that is strictly decreasing in n.
Similarly,
and
is strictly decreasing in y ( as soon as the solution is interior).
strictly
increasing in n thus implies that is strictly decreasing in n.
Finally we have to show that the equilibrium payoff is strictly decreasing in n. The proof is similar to the one of
Proposition 5.c) without the bars as the equilibrium is unique:
Given the definition of a Nash equilibrium:
The inequality tells us that
is not a best-response to
regarding point a) of Proposition 8, we also check:
In other words, this inequality relies on the fact that
Thus we can conclude that

. Moreover, as

is strictly increasing in n and

is decreasing in

. Now:

.

Proof of Proposition 9:
We have to show that, whatever the assumptions on the benefit and the damage functions, all equilibrium
emission levels are always increasing with the benefit-cost parameter γ. Nonetheless the proof relies on different
theorems depending on the nature of the interactions between countries. In particular there is no general static
comparative result when countries’ strategies are substitutable, except under particular conditions in the frame of
symmetric games.
a) Under the assumptions of Proposition 1 (
on φ), the global emission game is supermodular and
̃
has increasing differences in
as soon as the benefit function is increasing in its argument:
̃

.

(B.5)

Under these conditions, the lowest and the highest equilibria of the game are increasing in γ (Theorem A.5).
Consequently, and ̅ are increasing in γ. Given the linear relationship between the variables of the game, i.e.
and
, we can conclude that and ̅ and and ̅ are also increasing in γ.
b) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.a),
on φ and the game is submodular. We establish the
proof that zm, xm and ym are increasing in γ when
and using Theorem A.4. In fact the payoff function of
the country under consideration is increasing in x, , and increasing in γ, :
i)
,
ii)
,
.
If the second inequality were not checked, the equilibrium would be such that no country would pollute. Hence
the equilibrium emission level of the country under consideration is increasing in γ. Considering m polluting
countries, emission levels
and
are increasing in γ given the linear relationship between the variables (see
point a) of the proof).
c) Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.b),
on φ and payoff functions are quasi-concave. In
this case we rely on Theorem A.1 (Topkis, 1978) to establish the proof that all emission levels are increasing in
γ.
As countries are symmetric and the equilibrium is unique, we can rewrite the individual payoff function as a
function of x and γ:
.
(B.6)
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Equation (B.6) has increasing differences in (x, γ) as

̃

is always true. If the strategy set

is ascending in γ, then
is an increasing function of γ. Finally, because of the linear
relationship between the variables of the game,
and are also increasing in γ (see point a) of the proof). 
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